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Abstract: This paper examines the effects of strategic delegation in a simple ultimatum
game experiment. Our main concern is to examine the way delegation alter the way
players think about the game and play it. Specifically, we show that a delegate's offer
is more easily accepted by the responder as he is less keen to punish both the principle
and the agent. We also show that unobserved delegation by the responder lowers his
share as his agent is perceived to be more willing to accept tough offers. These effects
identify an additional explanation to the delegation phenomena.
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1. Introduction:
In many types of games players, instead of playing the game themselves, prefer
to send agents [hat play the game on their behalf. Why do players use agents to play
games? There are several possible explana[ions of this phenomena. The first is that in
some games, players choose agents who have special skills that make them better
players. For example, players may send lawyers to negotiation games in which the
knowledge of the law is an important part of the negotiation and may yield an
advantage in the negotiation. A second possible explanation for the delegation
phenomena is that players may send agents when they are under [he impression that
these agents are more intelligent or more experienced than they are and therefore may
play the game better than they do. This explanation, however, relies on a bounded
rationality argument in which some players are more able than others (they can either
think faster, calculate all the possible contingencies, think about creative alternatives
etc.) and where these abilities are important for playing the game. The third
explanation is that delegation may serve as a commitment device; that is, in such cases,
the mere possibility of using an agent may give the player an advantage in the game as
it allows him to commit to a certain behavior. The role of delegates as a commitment
device has been coined in the literature as strategic delegation and has been ex[ensively
discussed since Schelling (1960)t.
' For the different aspects of strategic delegation see Caillaud, Jullien, and Picard (1995), Fershtman
and Judd (1987), Fershtman , 1udd, and Kalai (1991), Fershtman and Kalai (1997), Gal-Or (1996),
Green (1990), and Katz (1991).fhe main structure of a delegation game entails an additional primary stage in the
game where players may hire delegates and either give them instructions on how to play
the game or sign compensation scheme contracts which reward the delegates according to
their performance. 7"he compensation scheme may, or may not, be publicly observable.
The possibility of observing the delegate's compensation scheme may drastically affect
the outcome oY the game. When the agent's comprnsation scheme is observable and
irreversible, it serves as a commitment device manipulating the agent's strategic behavior
and consequently the outcome of the game. The observability assumption has drawn
harsh criticism in the literature. Critics have claimed that when the compensation
schemes are not observable, delegation cannot serve as a commiunent device (see Katz
(1991)).' While ihe intuition of this claim may be convincing, the formal analysis is not
obvious. In a recent paper, Fershtman and Kalai (1997) analyzed simple ultimatum games
with unobserved delegation and showed the conditions under which delegation, even
when it is unobservable, may affect the outcome ofthe game.
In this paper we examine the effects of strategic delegation in a simple
ultimatum game experiment. Our main concern is to examine the effect of delegation
on the way players think about the game and how they play it.' We therefore extend
the discussion on delegation and consider the possibility ihat the use of delegates, by
itself, may affect the way players perceive the game and conseyuently the outcome of
ihe game.
' See also Dewatripoint (1988) for a discassion on the role of delegation as a commitment device when the
compensation scheme can be renegotiated.
' The role of agency in bargaining games was considered also by Schot[er, Snyder and Zheng (1995).
The main issue in that paper was the effect of agency on the efficiency of the bargaining. That is, do we
expect a grater breakdown of the bargaing process when it is executed by agents rather than by the
original players themselves.a
The standard ultimatum game is a two-player game in which at the first stage,
one of the players, denoted as the Proposer, proposes a divísion of a given pie between
himself and the other player. At the second stage, the other player, denoted as the
Responder, either `accepts" or "rejects" the offer. Acceptance is followed by
executing the division while rejection implies that both players get no share of the pie.
This type of ultimatum game has been extensively discussed in the literature (for recent
surveys see Camerer and Thaler (1995), Guth (1995), and Roth (1995)). While theory
implies that, at equilibrium, the Proposer gets all (or almost all) of the pie, experiments
show that most dívisions are not so extreme and that the average offer is typically
between 30 and 50 percent, with many 50:50 splits. Moreover, low offers (20 percent
or less) are frequently rejected.
Into the above ultimatum game setup, we introduce agents that represent either
the Responder or the Proposer. We let the players provide compensation schemes
(either observable or unobservable) for the agents and then we examine how the game
is played and how i[ differs from the ultimatum game without delegation.
Using a messenger to deliver bad messages (or, in our case, bad offers) is a
commonly observed practice. Would a Responder react identically to the same offers if
made directly by the Proposer or by the Proposer's messenger or agent? This is not a
simple issue. In doing ultimatum game experiments, the outcome usually differs from
theoretical subgame perfect equilibrium. Arguments like a taste for fair division4,
norms of behavior, etc., are commonly used in order to explain the deviation from the
' The meaning of"fair" and "unfair" is usually exogenously given and determined by the norm of
behavior in the society. It may vary across societies, groups, genders, etc..theoretical predictions (again, see the surveys by Camerer and Thaler (1995), Guth
(1995), and Roth (1995)). That is, the Proposer refrains from making an unfair offer
as he is afraid that such an offer will be rejected simply on the basis of being unfair.
However it is possible that the same Responder is willing to accept the sume offer from
an agent if he knows that it is not the agent who benefits from the unfair division and,
moreover, that in punishing the Proposer for an unfair offer, the agent will also be
puníshed automatically. Similarly, would an agent that represents the Responder, be as
sensitive as the Responder himself to "unfair" offers? After all there is no reason for
the agent to take such offers personally as it is the Responder who is treated unfairly.
Indeed our experiment indicates that the Proposers' payoffs are significantly
higher when they use delegates. Thís is since delegates offers are more easily accepted
because the Responder is less keen to punish both the principle and his delegate. Given
such a behavior the Proposer optimally provides incentives to his agent to give tough
offers. Note that in such a game the Responder has the ability to make "take it or leave
it" offers. Thus the advantagc from using an agent is not from the ability to use it as a
commitment device, but simply because his participation in the game induces a
different behavior from the other players i.e., the Responder.
On the other hand, our experiment indicates that unobserved delegation by the
Responder lowers his share as his agent is perceived to be more willing to accept tough
offers. That is, the willingness of the delegate to punish the Proposer for an "unfair"
proposal made to a third party (the Responder) is lower than the willingness of the
Responder himself to punish for a direct unfair proposal. Since the Proposer figures6
this effect in advance, he concludes that he can make a more greedy proposal with a
lower risk of being rejected.
2. Setup and design of the Delegation Game.
We conducted four experimental sessions, administrated in writing, and held in
regular class rooms. In sessions 1,..,4 we had 60, 42, 51, 39 participants, respectively
(192 in total). Participants were mostly first-year economic students recruited
voluntarily in their classes. They were informed that the experiment would consist of
two parts, but that they would be informed about the instructions for the second part
only after completing the first.
Part I in all sesions was a simple ultimatum game. This was done, first, in order
to have a benchmark for comparison with the delegation game, and second, for
methodological reasons. In this game, 100 `points' were to be divided between two
players, a"Proposer" and a"Responder" 5. At the first stage of the game, the
Proposer proposed a division of the 100 points. If the Responder accepted the division,
then both players got their shares. If the Responder rejected the offer, then both
players received zero. (The instructions for part I are given in Appendix 1).
Consider now the possible use of delegates in the above ultimatum game.
Delegates can be used either by the Proposer or by the Responderb. The delegation
contract may be either observable or unobservable. Part II of the experiment (which
t We used points instead of money in order to have a cake of I00. The conversion rate we used was 5
points - f l. At the [ime of the experiment, September 1996,f 1.6-~1.
6 The possibility exists that both the Proposer and the Responder will employ agents, but we do not
consider such a case in this paper.7
differed across sessions) examined the following four variations of ultimatum games
with delegation.
Deleg~.tion by the Proposer: In the first session, hereafter PO game (observable
delegation by the Proposer), the Proposer uses a delegate to make the proposal on his
behalf. An extra 20 points are available to the Proposer exclusively for use in providing
an incentive scheme for the delegate. That is, if after delegating [he action and
providing the incentive scheme, not all the 20 poin[s are paid to the delegate, none of
the original players may claim the remaining points. Under such rules, delegation is
costless; Thc pie to be divided between the Proposer and the Responder remains of the
same size with or without delegation, which enables a simple comparison beiween the
different scenarios that we investigate.
The procedure for Part II of the first session is as follows: At the first stage, the
Proposer hires an Agent and signs a publicly observed compensation contract that
specifies the Agent's fee as a function of the number of points the Proposer will
receive.' At the second stage of the game, the Agent proposes a division of the 100
points and the Responder needs to reply by "accept" or "reject". The final division is
similar to the original ultimatum game (Part I) wherein the delegate receives the points
according to his compensation scheme, but only if the Responder accepts the proposal
(i.e., the payoff to the Agent is also contingent on whether the proposal is accepted or
rejected). The insttvctions for this par[ are given in Appendix 2.
' A variation ofthis problem would be to compensate the delegate on the basis of the proposal that he is
making, independendy ofwhether the offer is accepted or rejected.R
The second session of the experiment, hereafter PN game, is the same as the PO
game but the delegate's compensation scheme in [his case is not observed.
The subgame perfect equilibrium of the PO game is as follows: the Proposer
provides the Agent with the compensation scheme of paying him 20 points (or any
other positive amount) if he proposes 99 points to him and 1 point to the Responder,
for any other proposal, the delegate will receive zero points. The delegate indeed offers
the division 99:1 and the Responder accepts. The equilibrium of the PN game is the
same as that of the PO game.
Do we expect any strategic delegation in games PO and PN? In these games,
the Proposer does not need the agent as a commitment device. According to the
structure of the game itself, the Proposer has the power to make "take it or leave it"
offers. In such a case, the possibility of using a delegate does not benefit the Proposer.
Our first hypothesis is based on this intuition; That is, the outcome of the PO and the
PN games would be the same as the outcome in the regular ul[imatum game.
The competing hypothesis is that the Proposer may benefit from the use of a
delegate. The rationale for such a hypothesis is that the Proposer may use the delegate
as a shield that allows him to indirectly give, by means of the delegate, bad offers.
That is, if the Proposer suggests a division in which he takes most of the points he runs
the risk that the Responder will "reject" the proposal in order to punish him for an
"unfair" offer. It is not clear that the Responder will react the same to an "unfair"
offer that comes from a third party. Moreover, if the Responder rejects the offer, he
punishes not only the original Proposer but also the "innocent bystanding" agen[. That
is, if we accept the view that players may choose to punish offers that are unfair, even9
at some cost to themselves, it is nontheless unclear whether they are willing to punish
players who are not to be blamed. In such a case, the delegate may be viewed as a
hostage.
We do not have a specitïc hypothesis for the PN game as the above "hostage"
argument also holds for this case. The question is, of course, if it is possible to use the
agent as a hostage even when the contract with him is unobservable.
Delegation by the Responder: In the third session of the experiment, hereafter BQ
game, it is the Responder who is using a delegate that will respond to the offer made
by the Proposer. The Responder may use the extra 20 points to provide the agent's
incentive scheme. The RO game proceeds as follows: At the outset of the game, the
Responder signs a public[y observed contract with the delegate. At the second stage the
Propuser, after observing the delegate's compensation scheme, makes his proposal of
the division of the 100 points. At the las[ stage, the delegate either accepts or rejects
the ufCer.
The fourth session of the experiment, hereafter N~~ m, is the same as the
RO game but in this case the delegate's compensation scheme is unobserved. That is,
the Responder is using an agent but the compensation scheme that he provides to this
agent cannot be observed by the Proposer.
For the RO game the theory indicates that the specific order of moves implies a
transfer of all the "power" to the Responder who, by providing the delegate's
rnmpensation scheme at the first stage becomes the tirst mover and thus gains the
ultimatum powec That is, while without the use of delegates the subgame perfectio
equilibrium is that the Proposer offers a division in which he receives 100 (or 99)
poin[s, to which the Responder agrees, the subgame perfect equilibrium in the RO
game is that the Responder provides the agent with the compensation scheme of paying
him 20 points if he accepts an offer of at least 99 points and zero otherwise. Thus, as
game theory suggests, the possibility of the Responder using strategic delegation
implies that at the subgame perfect equilibrium, he gets almost all the amount to be
divided.
Regarding this part of our experiment, the first hypothesis that we examine is
that the use of observable delegation, as in the RO game, affect the outcome of the
game by providing an advantage for the Responder. For such a case, we will examine
the basic intuition provided by the theoretical analysis.
In considering the role of observability we compare the outcomes of the
experiment of the RO game with that of the RN game in order to examine three
competing hypotheses. The first one is that delegation, when it is unobservable, is in-
affective and thus the outcome of the RN game will not be significantly different from
the outcome of the original ultimatum game. This hypothesis is in the spirit of Katz
(1992), who argues that in the RN game, delegation does not affect the outcome of the
game; in particular, the Responder cannot benefit from strategic precommitment. The
(rational agent) equilibrium of this game, as suggested by Katz, is that the Responder
provides the compensation scheme: "I will give you 20 points as long as you accept
any positive offer". The Proposer then offers the division of 99 to himself and 1 for the
Responder and the delegate will "accept" such a proposal.The second hypothesis is that the Responder may benefit from using an agent
even when the incentive scheme he provides is not publicly observed. This hypothesis
is in the spirit of Fershtman and Kalai ( 1997), who showed that commitment via
detegation may be beneticial even when the delegation is unobservable and the players
have the option to play the game themselves. The potential for such benefits depends
on the type of delegation (incentive versus instructive), the possibility of repetition, and
the probability of observability.
The third competing hypothesis is that the Responder will be worse off from
using an agent. That is, once the Proposer uses an agent and the incentive scheme is
unobserved, the proposals that he will get will be lower, as will his expected payoffs".
In such a case the Responder will be clearly better off without using an agent.
3. Results
I"he basic question in each of the four types of delegation games, in our
experiment, is whether thc use of a delegate changes the outcome of the game and under
what circumstances a Proposer (or Responder) may expec[ to benetit (or suffer) from the
use of a delegate. The outcome of our experiment is described in Appendix 3, Table Al,
in which we present all the proposals that were made in each of the four games, including
proposals that were rejected. In Table l, below, we present the average proposal and the
average payoffs (taking into account the rejections) for each part of our ti~ur games.
a We wish to delay the rationale for such an hypothesis to our discussion section.PO Game PN Game RO Game RN Game
Without Agent:
Ave. Proposal 56.67 55.71 57.69 55.50
Ave. profit for Proposer 47.67 49.52 49.23 48.00
Ave. Profit tbr responder 38.96 40.96 39.23 42.00
With Agent:
Ave. Proposal 64.50 59.29 47.06 66.92
Ave. profi[ for Proposer 60.50 52.86 39.41 57.69
Ave. profit for Responder 36.50 40.00 48.82 26.93
Table 1: The average proposal and the average payoffs in the four games. (The numbers
are the prob of a result larger than ~ z ~, where z is the test statistic).
In the first part of Table ], we present the results for the first part of the
experiment, in which players played the ultimatum game without delegation. In the
second part ofthe table we present the average proposal and payoffs (to bo[h the Proposer
and the Responder) in the four delegation games that we studied. Before elaborating on
these results, it would be useful to describe the distribution of the proposals that were
made in each variation ofthe delegation game. This is done in Figure 1.
Before turning to a more formal testing of our results, we provide a paitwise
comparison of the outcomes of the ultimatum games of the different games (see
Appendix 4). Our test indicates that there is no significant ex-ante difference between the
groups.
Now we turn to test our hypothesis regarding the differen[ effects of delegation.
To do so we compare, for each game, the outcomes of Part I(the ultimatum game) with13
the outcomes of Part II (the delegated game). For comparison, we use the Mann-Whitney
(í test. We report the test results in Table 2.
- - -. - - - -- -- PO PN RO RN
Game Game Game Game
Profit-
Proposer 0119 i007 Od55 0682
Protit-
Responder 12T 6616 0483 0326
Proposal 0349 4588 0254 0221
hable 2: Mann-W'hitney U tests with pairwise comparisons of Ihe medians ofoutcomes
in Part I and Part II of each game. ('Fhe numbers are the prob of a rasult larger than ~ z ~,
where z is the test statistic).
PO Game: When the Proposer uses an agent with an observable compensation
scheme, the average proposal went up from 56.6 to 64.5 and the average payofl~s to the
Proposer went up from 47.6 to 60.5 (see ~fable I). Obscrving "fable 2, it is evident that
when using a delegate, the Proposer gave signiticantly (at a.95 level of signiticance)
higher proposals (a larger share to himsclf and a lower share to the responder), and their
protits were significantly higher as well.
PN Game: From Table 1 one can see that when the Proposer uses an agent but the
compeosation scheme is unobserved, [he average proposal went t~p f~rom 55.7 to 59.3
while the Proposer's payoffs increases from 49.5 to 52.8. These changes are in the same
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Game RO: Observed contract between the Responder and the Agent
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1-igure I: The distribution of proposal that were made in each variation ofthe delegation
gamc.i r,
RO Game: When the Responder uses an agent and the contract is observable, the average
proposal decline.r from 57.7 to 47.0, the average payotTs of the Proposer declines from
49.2 to 39.4 while the Responder's average payoffs increase from 39.2 to 48.8. From
Tables 1 and 2 we thus learn that the use of a defegate by the Responder significantly
improves both the proposals that he receives and his payoffs he makes provided that the
agency contract is observable.
RN Game: In the RN game, the Responder uses an agent but the agency contract is
unobserved. From Tables I and 2 we learn that the unobserved delegation induces
significant changes in the offers made and the payoffs received by both players. The
average proposal increuses from 55.5 to 66.9, the Proposer's average payoff increuses
from 48.0 to 57.7, while the Responder's average payofT~s decreases from 42.0 to 26.99.
Surprisingly, the effect of unobserved delegation, in this case, is in the opposite direction
than in the RO case, in which the agency contract is observable. Thus, the use of an agent
with unobserved contract makes the Responder worse off.
4. Discussion: The different effects of delegation.
In the regular ultimatum game, it is the Proposer who has the power to make "take
it or leave it" offers, therefore, the theory suggests that he will receive all the surplus. In
such a case, there is no role for agency as a commitment device. Yet the results ofour PO
session indicate that the Proposers' payoffs are significantly higher when they use agents.
9 One of the two rejections in Part II ofgame RN is problematic. The Proposer in this observation offered
a division of60:40; the Responder offered the Agent 20 points for accepting this offer (contract 6 in
Appendix Sd), yet the Agent rejected the proposal. We report on on all our observations, but note that the
'spirit' of the above discussion would not change even if we did not take this observation into account.[~his result implies that an additional explanation for the effectiveness of delegation
exists. In the regular ultimatum game, the Proposer realizes, when making his offer, that
he might be punished for making an "unfair" offer. He also understands that although the
Respondcr is willing to punish him for an "unfair'~ proposat, this willingness decreases in
the presence of a delegate because punishing the Proposer would imply punishing an
"innocent" delegate as well. In other words,the Proposer uses the delegate as a hostage.
Note that indeed in the PO session, four out of ~0 (i.e. 1 io~o) proposals were rzjected in
the ultimatum game, but only one out of 20 (i.e. So~o) in the game with the agent-although
the overall proposals were significantly highcr in the delegated game.
In the PN game we did not identify any significant effect of delegation. Casual
observation of Figure I indicate an increase in the variance of the offers. We however
prefer at this stage, not to draw any specifíc conclusion from this part of the experiment
beyond the statement that the observability of the incentive contract changes the way
players play the game.
In the RO game, it is the Responder who uses an agent. In such a case, the agent
serves as a commitment device. At the tirst stage of the game, the Responder signs an
observable compensation scheme with the agent, which allows him to commit not to
accept certain otfers. tndeed, game theory suggests that the equilibrium for this game is
such that all the surplus accrues to the Responder. Our experiment indicates a significant
effect in the same qualitative direction. The Responder benefits trom the delegation and
his expected payoffs increase significantly.
We tind the outcome of the RN part of the experiment the most surprising. For
this part, we identitied initially three competing hypothesis. Ihe tirst one is that RNix
delegation does not affect the outcome of the game. The Responder cannot use the agent
as a commitment device because the incentive contract is not observable. The second
hypothesis is that even without observability there is some commitment value in
delegation; therefore, the Responder will benefit from the use of agents. We found out
that we can reject these two hypothesis and that, to our surprise, the Responder should
expect to end up worse off from using an agent with unobserved contract. The
explanation we suggest for this result is that the willingness ofthe delegate to punish the
Proposer for an "unfair" proposal made to a thirdparty (the Responder) is lower than Ihe
willingness of the original Responder to punish for a direct unfair proposal. Moreover,
the Proposer figures this effect in advance, and concludes that he can make a more greedy
proposal with a lower risk ofbeing rejected.
The above result is in contrast to Katz (1991) and Fershtman and Kalai (1997).
Katz (1991) argues that the use of a delegate with an unobserved contract will not
influence the outcome of the game (i.e., the outcomes will be similaz to those of the
ultimatum game). Fershtman and Kalai (1997) predict that, in many cases, the use of a
delegate influences bargaining even if the contract is unobserved, and thus the effect of
some delegations is in the direction ofthe RO prediction.
Note that while our experíment examines a game with unobserved delegation, it
cannot be viewed as an experiment that evaluates the different claims of Katz (1991)
and Fershtman and Kalai (1997). It has already been well established that the outcome
of ultimatum bargaining experiments differs from the [heoretical subgame perfect
equilibrium of this game. Thus, observing a difference in the outcomes of the RO and
the RN games may be due to the frequently observed deviation of these experiments19
from the equilibrium prescribed by game theory rather than an indication of the
theoretical role of unobserved delegation. To our opinion, the contribution of those
experiments that compare the outcomes of the RO and RN games with the original
ultimatum game without delegation is to see to what degree the use of delegation is
helpful and whether players take advantage of strategic delegation even when it is
unobservable.
Comparing the incentive contracts provided in the RO game and in [he RN
game indicates that the Responder indeed understands the role of delegation as a
commitment device. In the RO game the Responders provided an "aggressive"
incentive contracts. Observe that the median value for which he is giving all the 20
points to the agent is the amount of 80 to the Responder. In the unobserved case the
Responder realizes that the unobservability implies that agency does not have a
commitment value, and the median value for the agent to receive all the 20 points
decrease to 20 (see the table in Appendix Sd).
5. Concluding Remark.
ln this paper, wc have described an experimcnt dcsigned to analyze the effect of
delegation on the outcomes of ultimatum games. The main conclusion of this experiment
is that delegation significantly changes the outcome of the game. Beyond the standard
explanations of strategic delegation, our experiment sugges[s that the introduction of an
additional player, the agent in our case, changes the players' perceptions regarding the
norm of behavior and what constitute a fair division in the game they are playing. Thesesuggestions may be extended beyond the scope of ultimatum games and delegation.
"fhere are many games in which the strategic interaction may determine the entrance of a
new player into the game; for example, in market games in which entry deterence is
possible and the firms' actions may affect the possibifity of entrance. In such cases.
changes in the set of players may affect the players' perception about the (fair) norm of
behavior or other behavioral rules that the players prefer to obey. Such perceptions affect
the way that these type of games are played, and therefore changing these perception
should be discussed in a strategic context.References:
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Appendix 1: The introduction and instructions for part I
Introduction
The instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully you may earn a considerable
amount of money that will be paid [o you in cash at the end of the experiment. 60
students participate in this experiment. Each of you is about to get an envelope with a
number. This is your registration numbec Please look at it and then put it back in the
envelope without letting anyone else see it. At the end of the experiment you will be
asked to show the registration number you have in the envelope to the experimenter, and
he will pay you according to your performance. Do not forget to wrcite your registration
number on all the forms that you will get.
hhe experiment consists of two parts.
Instructions for part I
In this part, 100 points is to bc dividcd bctwccn two persons: the "Proposer" and the
"Responder". At the end of the experiment, each of the two persons will get 20 cents for
each point he will have.
A proposal about how to divide the 100 points between the two persons is made by the
Proposer. Upon receiving the proposal the Responder is asked to respond by either
accepting or rejecting it.
(a) Ifthe Responder accepts the proposal, then both he and the Proposer are paid
according to the proposal.
(b) [f the Responder rejects the proposal, then both persons are paid 0 points.
The procedure for Part I is as follows: 30 students will be selected randomly to play the
role of the Proposer in this part. Each Proposer will get a form on which he is asked to
indicate his proposal to the Responder. The proposal must be in multiples of 10 (0, ] 0,za
20, 30, etc.). For example, either 0 to the responder and 100 to the proposer, or 10 to the
responder and 90 to the proposer, etc.
Afrer the Proposers will make their choice we will collect all the forms in a box, and let
each of the 30 Responders students to pick randomly one form out of the box. The
Responder will not be able to know what is written on the form before choosing it, and
will never know the identity of the Proposer with whom he was matched (he will only
know the registration number of that person). The Responder is asked to indicate on the
form whether he accepts or rejects the proposal. We will collect the forms and write down
the payment for each student for this part (using the registration numbers). Then part II
will start. You will get the instructions for part II after part I will be over.?5
Appendix 2: The instructions for part lI ofgame PO
Instructions for part II
This part is similar to part l, but this time ihe Proposer can not make the proposal himsetf.
Instead, the Proposer must hire an "Agent" to make the proposal on his behalf. First, each
Proposer will write a contract with an Agent. The Agent will see the contract before
deciding how much to propose to the Responder. After the Agent will make the proposal
ihe Responder will see both the proposal and the contract between [he Proposer and the
Agent Then, the Responder will be asked to decíde whether to accept or reject the
proposal.
In order to pay the Agent, the Proposer gets 20 points (which he can use only to pay the
Agent). If the Proposer offers the Agent less than 20 poin[s, then the rest of the points are
lost.
The procedure for Part II is as follows: 20 students will be selected randomly to play the
role of the Proposer in this part. Each ofthem will get a form with the following table
Payment from the Proposer to the Agent
it points for the
Prupuser
Jt points to [he .4gent
0 10 20 30 511 60 70 80 90 100
In each column the Proposer ís asked to wTite how much to pay the Agent if he gets for
him the corresponding number of points. That is, ifaccording to the agents proposal this
amount of points will be given to the Proposer. For example, in the column of 90, the
Proposer is asked to write how much to pay the Agent if he gets for him 90 points, etc.
After all the Proposers will fill out this table on the form, we will collect the forms in a
box.26
We will then select randomly 20 students out of the remaining 40 to play the role of the
Agent. Each Agent will pick randomly one form out of the box, and observe the table that
the Proposer he is matched with made. The Agent is now asked to make a proposal to the
Respondec The forms will be collected again in the box.
Each of the remaining 20 students will be a Responder. Each will randomly pick one
form out of the box and observe both the Agent's payment table and the proposal made
by the Agent. Then he is asked to decide whether to accept or reject the proposal. The
Responder is asked to indicate his choice on the form.
To summaries, the procedure is as follows:
The Proposer ~ The Agent --~ The Responder
Writes a contract with Observes the contract and Observes both the contract and
the Agent makes a proposal the proposal and decides whether
to accept or reject the proposal
Remarks:
(a) The payment from the Proposer to the Agent does not have to be in multiples of 10.
(b) Ifthe proposal that the Agent makes is rejected, then all persons, including the Agent,
get 0 points for Part 11.
We will then collect all the forms, find out how much money each of you eamed in Part I
and Part 11, and pay each of you privately. This will end the experiment. Ifyou have any
question please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to you.:lppendix 3: The Proposals
----~~- --. -- --
PO Game PN Game RO Game RN Game
Wthout With Without With Without With Without With
tt Agent Agent Agent Agent Agent Agent Agent Agent
1 80' 90 80 90' 90` 70` 90' 90
2 80 90 70' 80 70` 60` 80 80
3 70` 80' 70 70 70 60 70 80
4 70 80 60' 70 70 60 60` 80
5 70 70 60 70 70 60 60 70
6 60' 70 60 60 70 50 60 70
7 60' 70 60 60 70 50 60 70
8 60 70 60 60 60` 50 60 60`
9 60 60 60 50 60 50 60 60'
10 60 60 60 50 60 50 50 60
11 60 60 50 50 60 50 50 60
12 60 60 50 50 60 40 50 50
13 60 60 50 40 60 40 50 40
14 60 60 50 30 60 30 50
15 60 60 50 60 30 50
16 50 50 50 50 30 50
17 50 50 50 50 20 50
18 50 50 50 50 50
19 50 50 50 50 30
20 50 50 40 SO 30











Proposer 47.67 60.5 49.52 52.86 49.23 39.41 48 57.69
-- - --- --- --.. .- -
Ave profit
Responder 38.96 36.5 40.96 40 39.23 48 82 42 26.93 , ---------..--- - .----- ----
Average
proposal 56.67 64.5 55.71 59 29 57 69 47.06 55.5 66.92
Table Al : The Proposals made by subjects. The proposals that were rejected are with a'.Appendix 4 Comnaring the not)ulation in the four games.
We use the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test based on ranks in order to test whether
the samples of the outcomes come from populations having the same median. This is the
appropriate test because the distributions are not normal. We report the test results in
Table A2.
Game Game Game Gamc Game Game
I and 2 I and 3 I and 4 2 and 3 2 and 4 3 and 4
Profi[-
Proposer 8934 6873 9526 8139 8449 6657
Profit-
Responder 7449 8630 9842 6378 JS43 8767
Proposal 7814 7116 7215 SS62 9169 5062
Table A2: Mann-Whitney U tests with pairwise comparisons of the medians of outcomes
in the ultimatum game by sessions. (The numbers are the prob of a result larger than ~ z ~,
where z is the test statistic).
From Table A2 we leam that, with a.95 level of significance (actually, even at .5
level of significance) we cannot reject the hypothesis that each of the two samples




0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
1 0 10 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
2 0 5 10 15 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
3 0 0 10 1S 20 20 20 15 ]S 10 10
4 0 5 10 15 18 20 18 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 S ]0 20 15 ]0 S 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 lS 20 10 0 0 0
7 0 0 S 5 10 10 20 10 0 0 0
8 0 0 5 5 S 10 ]0 20 20 20 20
9 0 0 0 0 0 10 15 20 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0
11 0 2 4 6 10 15 18 19 20 20 20
12 0 2 4 6 8 14 16 18 20 20 20
13 0 2 4 6 8 10 15 18 20 20 20
14 0 2 4 6 10 12 15 17 20 20 20
15 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 IS 20 20 20
16 0 0 0 S 5 5 ]0 15 20 20 15
17 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 20
18 2 8 5 7 0 19 13 16 0 2 3
19 8 8 ]0 10 11 14 14 IS IS 18 18
20 9 S 0 7 8 4 3 10 15 9 3
Appendix Sa: The contracts of game PO.3O
Amount
forthe
Proposer 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
1 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
2 0 5 10 15 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
3 0 3 9 15 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
4 0 8 10 ]2 18 20 20 20 20 20 20
5 0 4 8 12 16 20 16 12 8 4 0
6 0 0 5 5 15 18 20 5 5 0 0
7 0 5 8 10 12 15 20 20 20 20 20
S 0 0 0 0 5 10 20 20 20 20 20
9 0 3 7 ]0 13 15 19 20 20 20 20
10 0 0 0 8 10 15 18 20 10 10 10
11 0 0 5 5 ]0 10 15 20 20 20 20
12 0 0 0 0 5 ]0 15 20 20 20 20
13 0 2 4 5 6 8 10 15 20 20 20
14 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Appendix 56: The contracts of game PN.Amount
forthe
Responder
0 10 20 30 40 SO 60 70 80 90 100
1 5 10 15 20 10 5 l0 15 0 10 20
2 0 5 10 15 18 20 20 20 20 20 20
3 0 5 ]0 10 15 15 20 20 20 20 20
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 20 20 20 20
5 0 1 ] 2 2 5 5 20 ~ 1 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 20 20 20
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 20 20 20
8 0 0 4 6 10 ]0 16 18 20 20 20
9 0 1 4 10 13 14 15 15 20 20 20
10 0 0 0 0 0 5 10 15 20 20 20
11 0 12 15 15 16 16 18 18 19 20 20
12 0 2 5 10 10 15 15 15 15 20 20
13 0 3 4 5 11 12 14 ]7 18 19 20
14 0 ~ 4 ó 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
15 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
16 0 i5 15 15 15 IS ]5 15 15 15 20
17 1 1 1 1 1 I 2 5 l0 15 20
Appendix Sc: The contracts ofgame KO.Amount
forthe
Proposer
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
1 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
2 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
3 0 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
4 0 ]0 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
5 0 10 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
6 0 5 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
7 0 0 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
8 0 0 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
9 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 Il 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
11 0 2 4 16 18 19 12 14 16 18 20
12 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
13 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Appendix Sd: The contracts ofgame RN.No. Author(s)
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